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Insider Trading and the Use of
Private Information
Abstract
Recent research in accounting has been concerned with the
managerial motivation for discretionary disclosure of private informa-
tion. This paper has examined one possible incentive: profiting from
insider trading. The disclosure of earnings forecasts by corporate
officials was the private information studied. Several trading
strategies were formulated by the use of (i) intensity of insiders'
trading activities as to whether sales or purchase was the dominant
trade; (2) the quality of information content of the managers'
earnings predictions by comparison with the prevailing forecasts
that were forumulated by financial analysts,; (3) the timing of
the trade vis. a. vis managers disclosure of earnings predictions; and
(4) the legality (or apparent legality) of the insider trading.
The results of the analysis for 134 companies and about 3000
trades indicate the following: (a) the signals provided by managers'
earnings forecasts were superior to those provided by insider trading
in terms of accumulating significant abnormal returns; (b) insiders'
buying activities in conduction with favorable earnings forecasts
provided the most profitable trading strategy irrespective of whether
insiders' purchasing preceded or followed the discretionary disclosure
of forecasts by corporate officieals; and (c) no consistent evidence
was obtained concerning the profitability of illegal trades by insiders
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INSIDER TRADING AND THE USE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION
The asymmetry of information between insiders and others trading in
the company's shares provides the impetus for the recent research on
insider trading. Managers know more than outsiders about the impact of
their investment, operating and financing decisions. As rational
decision makers who seek to maximize their own wealth, managers are
expected to seek to profit from trading in the shares of the companies
they manage. That is, they are expected to earn returns to superior
information [Kakansson, 1977 and 1981]
.
Both Jaffe [1974] and Finnerty [1976] provided evidence suggesting
the possibility of earning abnormal returns (for an extended period)
using insiders' trading activity. Based on the significance of Jensen's
alpha, Finnerty asserted that the evidence bears out "the fact that
insiders, because probably of their access to priviliged information
,
can outperform the market in their stock selections" [1976, p. 1146,
emphasis added] . Finnerty, however, did not investigate insiders'
trading activity with respect to any particular piece of information
which would be considered "privileged" for managers. Penman [1982] took
that step. Ke examined the significance of insider trading as a deter-
minant of excess returns during the days surrounding the announcement of
earnings forecasts. Although earnings forecast information was not used
directly as an independent variable, Penman used the day of the disclo-
sure of earning forecasts (by management) as the critical event date.
He reported that insiders' trading is a statistically significant
explanatory variable of the abnormal returns observed in the three days
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surrounding the day on which earnings forecasts were announced. Monthly
trades by corporate officials were used to derive an index of trades
that became the independent variable in a regression equation explaining
daily abnormal returns. The index of monthly trades was defined as the
net of purchases before and after the forecast date. Allen (1982)
evaluated the profitability of insider trading around the actual earn-
ings (not forecast by management) announcement date, using mechanical
models to generate the expectation apparently held by insiders. The
results were conflicting, making Allen conclude that the relationship is
"mere complex than is posited by the profit trading conjecture."
Although somewhat similar in objective, the work reported in this
study was carried out independently and serves as a logical extension of
i
both the Penman and Allen studies". The objective of this study is to
evaluate managers ' knowledge and use of private information as an
incentive for voluntary public dissemination of certain accounting
information. The question is whether corporate executives time their
voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts in order to facilitate and
2
maximize the profit from trading in the shares of their own companies .
Thus
,
this paper evaluates the performance of several trading strategies
that utilize insiders' knowledge of the predicted earnings per share
(EPS) prior to their making it public. In a sense, this paper also
examines the information content of the combined signals provided by
insiders' trading (purchase or sale) and the insiders' (managers')
public disclosure of predicted EPS. The approach employs different
trading combinations in which one of the two information signals
(disclosure of predicted EPS and insiders' trading) was conditioned on
the other.
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The information signals provided by corporate officials were
measured by the signed deviations of the predicted EPS numbers
(disclosed by corporate officials) from the EPS forecasts provided by
financial analysts prior to the disclosures by insiders. Beshara [1980]
used this measure in evaluating the information content or "newness" of
managements' predictions of earnings. Ajinkya and Gift [1984] and Fried
and Givoly [1982] have also used analysts' forecasts as the preferred
surrogate of market expectations held by the public at large. The
management forecast signal or "newness" measure was classified into
favorable and unfavorable, depending on whether managers' prediction of
EPS exceeds analysts' forecasts or vice versa.
Standardized prediction errors using the market model were used to
evaluate the performance of the several trading strategies examined.
Cur results indicate that abnormal returns are associated with insiders'
trading activities that are dominated by insiders ' purchases and which
are followed or preceded by a favorable forecast signal. This includes
insiders' activities that could be illegal; namely, purchasing prior to
the disclosure of a favorable forecast. This result is a further
refinement of the results reported by Allen [1982] and Penman [1982] .
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The disclosure of a subset of corporate financial information is
governed by the requirements promulgated by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board and sanctioned by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) . Public disclosure of any other type of financial information is
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made at the discretion of management. The discretionary nature of this
information disclosure prompts interest in investigating the incentives
and the motivation of managers to voluntarily make certain disclosures.
Cf Darticular significance is the managers ' choice to publicly disclose
the numbers they predict for the income of the companies they manage.
The SEC embarked in 1973 on a campaign to seek acceptance for a
rule mandating corporate officials to disclose their EPS predictions.
Several proposals [SEC 1973, 1975, 1978, 1979] were made but all have
been strongly opposed by corporate management. In a recent survey for
the Conference Soard, Lees [1981] reported that "fear of legal action by
disgruntled investors if company earnings forecasts prove to be incor-
rect is, of course, one of the most basic reasons why managements are
reluctant to disclose projections. ...(Most survey respondents) prefer
to avoid exposure to potential risks simply by refraining from disclos-
ing their internal forecasts" [1981, p. 21]. This reluctance, or
perhaps resistance, of corporate executives to endorse proposals that
either require or encourage them to disclose their earning predictions
cannot be easily reconciled with the fact that some executives indeed
voluntarily disclose their earnings predictions. Clearly, under
voluntary disclosure, the threat of being held liable to a third party
is diminished by not filing forecasts in an official document, but is
net completely eliminated. Thus, it is important to investigate the mo-
tivation for the decisions of corporate officials to voluntarily dis-
close their earnings predictions.
Incentives for voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts are not
obvious because corporate officials make direct public disclosures of
their earnings predictions only very infrequently. According to Penman,
4
the 737 forecasts in his test sample "comprised 350 firms making only
one forecast in the six year period, 107 firms making two forecasts, 34
making three, 15 making four, one making five, and one making six"
[1S30, p. 137]. Other studies provided similar evidence (e.g., Patell
[1976], and Beshara [1980]). Such paucity of disclosure might be ex-
plained as a market for lemons [Akerlof , 1970] in which only the produc-
ers of superior quality commodities engage in overt signaling (Spence
[1973]), except that two additional considerations do not permit this
explanation to stand. First, there is no evidence to suggest that the
quality of managements 1 forecasts that were not publicly disclosed is
necessarily poor (Daily [1971]). Secondly, corporate officials of the
majority of public companies do not disclose their earnings predictions.
As indicated [Penman, 1980, p. 137], only 512 companies were found to
have publicly disclosed (in a direct fashion) their earnings predictions
over a period of six years, an average of less than 100 companies a
year. Even though the Wall Street Journal is not a comprehensive source
of disclosure, the majority of companies clearly do not voluntarily
disclose their earnings forecasts. Accordingly, it is not possible to
assert that the lack of disclosure is a signal of an inferior quality of
earnings. An alternative conjecture explaining the observed infrequency
of earnings forecasts by managers is provided by Ajinkya and Gift
[1984] , who find evidence that both favorable and unfavorable earnings
information is voluntarily revealed when the prevailing (market)
earnings expectations are judged by company managers to be "unrealistic"
and in need of correction. Further, the market (stock prices) reacts
"as if" the voluntary revelation was unbiased.
5
In conducting a test of the signalling hypothesis at the security
crice level, Peraan [1980] investigated the association between manage-
ments' forecasts and standardized excess daily returns for a large
sample of forecasts. He concluded that
forecasting firms do, on average, enjoy "good times" during
the three months (approximately) on either side of the fore-
cast data, and net only on the day of the forecast announce-
ment. This concurs with the disclosure result from the T~
test; voluntary forecast disclosure is associated with firms
which, on average, exhibit returns which are higher than those
for the market as a whole, other things being held equal
[1980, p. 155]
.
Thus, Penman's findings appear to indicate that the mere "act of
disclosure" of earnings predictions by corporate officials signals the
quality of the firm and increases its value. Hcwever, such a conclusion
was not fully substantiated when Penman resorted to additional analysis
using a split design, a portfolio consisting of firms with positive
earnings forecast signals and another with negative earnings forecast
signals. Prediction errors were derived frcm management forecasts
compared against earnings forecasts generated frcm a mechanical (a
martingale with drift) model. Penman's findings for the portfolios
based on strict positive and negative forecasts errors are consistent
with those reported by others (Jaggi [1978] , Seshara [1980] , and Ajinkya
and Gift [1984]). In particular, negative prediction errors are
associated with negative abnormal returns and vice versa. Hence, the
hypothesis that managers voluntarily disclose their earnings predictions
in order to increase the value of their shares through the mere "act of
disclosure" (which itself serves as a favorable signal) is not
supported; seme of the predictions disclosed by corporated officials are
associated with negative price changes.
6
The hypothesis examined in this paper tests whether insiders
capitalize on (1) their informational advantage, (2) the discretion over
whether or not to disclose their earning predictions, and (3) the
discretion over the timing of disclosure to profit from trading on their
own account. While implementing trading strategies that maximize their
own trading profits (using the private knowledge of forecasted earnings)
might be illegal, trading on the companies' shares by insiders after the
public disclosure of information is often assumed to be legal. Under
rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, certain trading
activities that executives undertake are illegal if they are based on
information that is private to insiders. The objective of this paper,
therefore, is to examine the extent to which insiders systematically
utilize the private information about earnings predictions and the
discretionary power to time their disclosure (if they elect to disclose)
to earn abnormal returns. Thus, the two broad hypotheses being examined
(in their null form) are:
BH.l: Managers do not earn abnormal returns on what might be
illegal speculative trading strategies.
BH.2: Managers do not earn abnormal returns on legal speculative
trading strategies.
TRADING STRATEGIES
To form meaningful trading strategies that would be dependent on
the information contained in managers' disclosure of EPS, it is neces-
sary to develop a measure of the information content of the signal. The
evidence presented in the literature dees not lend strong support for
the use of the mechanical models in deriving market expectations.
Hence, financial analysts' forecasts are used in this paper as a
7
superior surrogate of market expectations. The unexpected portion (and
hence the information) of corporate earnings forecasts is measured by:
d. » M tJ -A. w .. and, d
3 Jt'Y 3t-At,y 3
F for d. >
j
U for d. <
where: M. is the manacement's prediction of the yth yearjt,y ' e
earnings per share of the jth firm announced at time
t.
A. is the financial analvst's forecast of the yth vear
3t-At,y
earnings per share of the jth firm announced at time
t - At (the last financial analyst forecast avail-
able prior to t)
.
At is the interval of time between the two forecasts
when financial analysts are not known to have
announced any revisions of their earnings' forecasts
for the jth firm; this time interval varies from one
firm to another and is approximately 1-3 weeks in
length.
? is an indication of a favorable, or better than
expected earnings forecast.
U is an indication of an unfavorable, or worse than
expected, earnings forecast.
The signal F or U is privately known to corporate officials prior
to their decision to publicly disclose it. Trading by insiders (T)
before the disclosure (denoted t = b) might be based en that private
a
information. Since insiders may purchase (P) or sell (S) the shares of
their own companies, then, legality aside, a profitable trading strategy
for insiders to follow is to purchase shares before disclosing favorable
news and to sell before disclosing unfavorable news. Similarly, insid-
ers' trading (T) after the disclosure of the managements' earnings
predictions (t = a) can consist of purchasing and selling shares of
their own company. Trading after the disclosure of earnings predictions
(at t = a) is more likely to be legal than illegal, although that would
depend further on managers ' intent and knowledge of specific
information. During that period, profitable trading strategies could
consist of: selling after disclosure of a favorable forecast and
purchasing after disclosure of an unfavorable forecast. The four
trading strategies that are expected to generate abnormal returns to
insiders are summarized in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 1
Profitable Trading Strategies
Trading Period
Forecast (d) Before
Signal (b)
Favorable (F) P
Unfavorable (U) S
After
(a)
S
P
That is:
(1) Purchase before, and/or sell after the disclosure of the
favorable (d = F) signal.
(2) Sell before and/or purchase after the unfavorable (d = U)
signal.
3oth trading strategies are predicated on the viability of several
assumptions. First, insiders have monopolistic knowledge of the nature
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of the information signal as to favorable or unfavorable. Second,
managers have complete discretion and control over the timing of the
disclosure of their EPS predictions. Third, insiders believe that the
information signal will be impounded by the market in a manner consis-
tent with the signal; i.e., price will increase (decrease) after the
disclosure of a favorable (unfavorable) signal. Finally, managers are
assumed to believe that the legality of their insider trading will not
be questioned.
The first two assumptions are satisfied by the nature of private
information so long as the corporate disclosure of EPS forecasts remains
discretionary. As indicated earlier, recent efforts by the SEC to
regulate management forecasts have failed. The third assumption has
strong empirical support. The work of Fateii [1976] , Jaggi [1978]
,
Penman [1980] , Beshara [1980] , Ajinkya and Gift [1984] and others has
consistently reported the existence of a significant association between
managements earnings forecasts and security prices. Similar results
were reported by Abdel-khaiik and Ajinkya [1982] for earnings forecasts
that were private information to security analysts. These results are
further validated in this paper.
The fourth assumption—legitimacy of insider trading—is mere
difficult to establish. Under the 1934 Act, trading on insider informa-
tion is illegal and, depending on the type of offense, is punishable by
3tines or imprisonment. Thus, it is important to explain certain
research findings indicating that insider trading generates abnormal
returns for eight [Jaffe, 1974], or eleven [Finnerty, 19761, months
after insider transactions. Not only is such a long period of informa-
tion assimilation inconsistent with the semi-strong form of market
10
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efficiency, but it is also inconsistent with other evidence. On the
one hand, the results of Lorie and Neiderhcffer failed to "uncover
systematic exploitation of confidential information by insiders" [1968,
p. 46] . On the other, Kecwn and Pinkerton [1981] report significant
insider trading activity immediately prior to merger announcements.
These conflicting results do not lend strong support for the illegality
versus legality dimension of insider trading.
In general, U.S. law prohibits trading by insiders on the basis of
private information about which they possess an informational advantage.
Hence , insider trading based on private knowledge of forecasted EPS
prior to making a public disclosure is very likely to be illegal. On
the other hand, trading by corporate officials subsequent to disclosure
is more likely to be legal unless the trade is a sale (that followed
within a 6-month period from a purchase)
.
METHOD
Data
Management forecasts of annual earnings per share were gathered
primarily from the Wall Street Journal Index (and some from Standard and
Poors' Earnings Forecaster ) for the 5-year period from 1973 through
1977. Financial analysts' forecasts were taken from Standard and Poors'
Earnings Forecaster for the same 5-year period. Insider trading
information was collected frcra the SEC's Official Summary of Insider
Trading for the 7-year period 1972 through 1973. Additional screens
that were applied to the data are the following:
(i) Firms were restricted to NYSE listings with December 31 fiscal
years.
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(ii) The management forecast of earnings per share (EPS) was a
point estimate or a bounded range estimate (for which the mean
was used as the point estimate)
.
(iii) Monthly stock returns were available on the CPS? tapes for the
four years preceding the year of the management forecast, the
forecast year, and the year following the forecast.
(iv) At least one analyst's forecast of EPS was available in the
Earnings Forecaster such that the date of the forecast (and
not the issue date of the publication) was within two to three
weeks prior to the date of the related management forecast.
If more than one analyst forecast was available during the
specified period, then the one closest to the date of the
management forecast was used.
(v) Insider trading during the month of December was excluded in
order to avoid confounding the motivation of the end-of-year
liquidation with the one stipulated in this paper. For
similar reasons, the exercising of options by insiders was
excluded from the data collected on purchasing.
Independent Variables
The availability of management earnings predictions was the most
restrictive condition. About 150 firms (wirh 190 forecasts) satisfied
all data requirements during the 1973-77 period. Additional
experimental design considerations (see below) reduced this set of
firms/forecasts even further. Next, the sample of management forecasts
(firm/year) was classified as to whether the related net insider trading
activity was primarily "sale" or "purchase," and whether such net
activity occurred before or after the disclosure of the EPS forecast by
corporate officials.
The consideration of insider trading extended from the six months
prior, to the six months following, the related management predictions.
The classification of the dominant trading activity (i.e., 3 = sale or ?
= purchase) was mace on the basis of the ratio of number of shares sold
the number of total shares traded by insiders. This ratio was
calculated separately for the period preceding and the period following
12
the related management forecast. The rule of thumb applied to classify
net trading activity as either S or P was the following:
- If the trading ratio was > 2/3 , then insider activity = S
- If the trading ratio was < 1/3 , then insider activity = ?
- if the trading ratio fell between 1/3 and 2/3, then insider
activity = "unclear" and the observation was dropped from the
sample.
Using a classification based on the nature of the dominant insider
trading activity and its timing with respect to the forecast, the sample
was divided into four categories: purchase-before (P, ) , sale-beforeb
(S, ) , purchase-after (P ) , and sale-after (S ) .
a a a
As indicated earlier, the surprise value of predictions of earnings
by corporate officials was measured in relation to earnings forecasts
made by financial analysts prior to the release of management pre-
dictions. Thus, financial analyst forecasts were used as a surrogate
for the prevailing earnings expectations. The forecast variable was
measured (terms previously defined) as follows:
( Favorable insider information for d . >
j "jt "jt-At
=d
.
= M
.
.
- A
.
:
] Unfavorable insider information for d. <
I 3
The classification of the sample on the basis of the above independent
variables is depicted in Table 1. The total number of classified
forecasts is 134 (for 101 firms). The forecasts with d. = were
excluded frcm the analysis. Table 2 indicates the number of insider
transactions and the number of shares traded by insiders for the various
cells.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here
13
Table 1
Classification of the Sample into
Portfolios Based on
Dominant Insider Trading Activity
d = Tenor
of Insider
Information
(Forecast)
Net
Classification
of Insider
Trading
t = Time Period in Relation
to Forecast Disclosure Month!
?
S
30
12
20
12
17
15
17
11
Total 74 60 = 134
where:
? = primarily purchase;
b = before disclosure;
F = favorable;
S = primarily sale
a = after disclosure
U = unfavorable
14
Table 2
Number of Insider Transactions and Shares Traded
in Thousands in Each Portfolio
(1) Number of transactions (or trades)
F U
b a b a
Dominant insider
activity
P
S
1
440
228
352
277
320
384
275
270
(2) Number of shares traded in thousands:
p
s
1,478
410
1,002
614
617
608
" 524
500
Legend: As in Table 1.
Cecer.dent Variable
Abnormal market reaction associated with the dual signals of
insider trading and management forecasts was computed for the 13-month
period surrounding the month of the forecast. Different 8-month subpe-
ricds (within the overall 13 months) were used as test periods for the
various hypotheses that are discussed below. For each forecast
(firm/year) in the sample the market model was estimated over a 48 month
regression period just preceding the related test period:
f = a + 8 r . + u .pt p p at pt
where
f = rate of return on stock o for month t,
Pt
f = rate of return on the market portfolio for month t computed
from an equally weighted index,
a = intercept,
P
6 = svstematic risk of stock p,
P
u = error term of stock o during month t, with the usualpt
assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares regression, and
t = a month during the estimation period (t=l, ..., T)
.
Using the parameters estimated during the preceding 48 months (T =
48) , monthly abnormal returns or prediction errors were generated for
each test oeriod as:
u = r
,
- (a + 3 'r
, ) (2)pk pk p p mk
where k = month in the test period. The raw or unstandardized
cross-sectional average abnormal returns for month k (AJO and the
related cumulative unstandardized abnormal returns up to month q in the
test period (CAR ) are calculated as:
q
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1
N
p=l
(3)
and
CAR = E AR,
q q k=l
K
where N is the number of firms in the particular portfolio.
(4)
Following Pateii [1976] and Hcng, Kaplan and Mandelker [1973] , the
abnormal returns are scaled by the regression standard error ( /C , S )
• V pk p
to yield standardized abnormal returns V
,
as follows:
Pk
where
pk pk \J pk p
C l. " 1 + mok T [r .
- r }
2/ Z (r „ - r )
2
mk m mt m
and sj* = 2 u* / (T - 2)
? t-1 Pt
where r = average market return over the 48 month estimation period.
m
The cross-sectional standardized average abnormal Returns (SAiO
for month k over all firms (M) in a particular portfolio is given by
SA\ - \ - i \ V " (6)p=l
The V measure can be normalized to yield the standard-normal Z dis-
P^
tribucion as:
Vk
N
p-1 Pk
t
(7)
where the variance X, is a function of T and is given by:
17
N
X- = Z [ (T - 2) / (T - 4)] (8)
t
D = l
Similarly, standardized cumulative abnormal returns for the pth
stock (up co nonth q in the test period) are developed as the statistic
W such that:
pq
q 2 h
W = I u ,/(qC , S K (9)
pq k=1 p*
n pk p
and the related cress-sectional average (SCAR ) becomes:
q
i
N
SCAR = W - i I W (10)
q q n pssl pq
Again, a z-test can be constructed as:
N
Z
rT
= S W /X (11)W
,
pa t
q p= i
where X is the same as above (the square root of Equation 8)
.
The experimental design used the 8 portfolios (shown in Table 1)
formed by the 2 combinations of the three independent variables. For
each of these 8 portfolios, the monthly average standardized returns
(AR, ) , the cumulative average standardized returns (SCAR ) , and the
< q
related test statistics ( (Z„ and Z ) were calculated for various testV w
periods.
The test periods were designed to evaluate the impact of insider
trading activity conditional on the forecast information signal (F or U)
and vice versa. The period (s) chosen had to cover the impact of both
the insider trading and the management forecast. From the results of
several past: studies, it can be assumed that the market reaction to
forecast information is unlikely to persist beyond a month following the
forecast month. The insider trading period was limited to six months
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before or after the month of forecast. Here, the periods chosen for
examination were months -6 to +1 and months -1 to +6, assuming that
month was the forecast month. In adopting the test periods, two
additional considerations were that:
(i) the period should be mere than 6 months long, which is the
legally limiting period after which the profits earned from
insider trading need not be turned back to the firm, and
(ii) all periods used in calculating returns should be of the same
length, in order to avoid biases resulting from differences in
investment horizons.
Operational Hypothesis
This section derives operational hypotheses related to the primary
focus of this study, that is, evaluating the outcome of various insider
trading strategies. At a later stage (in the Results section) , a
subsidary hypothesis that essentially verifies the information content
of the forecast signal (per se) is presented.
(1). Insider Trading and Favorable Forecasts:
As stated earlier, it would be illegal for managers to use their
private knowledge as insiders to trade in the shares of % their own
companies. One profitable strategy would be to purchase one's own
company's shares before the disclosure of a favorable EPS predicion. A
similar alternative strategy would involve a sale of shares ( held by
insiders since the beginning of the test period) just after the
disclosure of favorable information. These trading combinations were
evaluated under two conditions depending on whether the signals conveyed
to the market by the dominant trading activity of insiders were
consistent (C) or inconsistent (I) with the information content of
managers' EPS predictions. This additional partitioning was done to
admit the possibility that "outside" market participants may evaluate
19
and react differently depending on whether the two information signals
(the trade and the forecast) emanating from the firm were either
internally consistent or inconsistent. The related four combinations
are:
Consistent signals :
Case 1: Purchase before a favorable forecast (possibly illegal)
Case 2: Purchase after a favorable forecast (legal)
Inconsistent Signals :
Case 3: Sale after a favorable forecast (possibly illegal)
Case 4: Sale before a favorable forecast (legal)
The profitability of the various insider trading combinations
associated with the favorable forecast signal is examined in the
hypotheses below. Two test periods are used to test all hypotheses.
Both periods encompass the effect of the forecast. But one period
encompasses the trading while the other does not. Thus, the period -1
to +6 months relative to the forecast month (month 0) contains the
forecast as well as the trading activity after (i.e., P or S ) the
* a a
forecast, but not the trading activity in the six months prior to the
forecast. Similarly, the period -6 to +1 months contains the forecast
and only the trading activity before the forecast (i.e., P, or S, ) . Asb o
a result, the observed market returns during a particular period will
depend upon whether the period effectively contains only one signal (the
forecast), two consistent signals, or two inconsistent signals.
For the favorable (F) forecast signal, the above discussion leads
to the following operational hypotheses for the two test periods (in
their expectational form)
:
H : SCAB (P. |f) > for [-1/+6] (Cne signal only)
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SCAR (P.jF) > for [-6/+1] (Two consistent signals)
H : SCAR (S |F) =0 for [-1/+6] (Two inccnsisternt signals)
a
SCAR (S JF) > for [-6/+11 (One signal only)
H : SCAR (P |F) > for [-1/+6] (Two consistent signals)
— — a
SCAR (P JF) > for [-6/+1] (One signal only)
cL
H.: SCAR (S, If) > for [-1/+6] (One signal only)
z2 b '
SCAR (S, JF) =0 for [-6/+1] (Two inconsistent signals)
Note that SCAR stands for standardized cumulative average abnormal
returns and P , P , S and S signify purchase-before, purchase-after,
C cL cL O
sale-after and sale-before, respectively.
(2) Insider Trading and Unfavorable Forecasts ;
The unfavorable EPS forecast signal and the type of insider trading
activity involve four combinations as follows:
Consistent Signals :
Case 5: Sale before an unfavorable forecast (possibly illegal)
Case 6: Sale after an unfavorable forecast (legal)
Inconsistent Sicnais:
Case 7: Purchase after an unfavorable forecast • (possibly illegal)
Case 8: Purchase before an unfavorable forecast (legal)
21
Given the unfavorable forecast signal, insiders could profit by
engaging in the following two trading combinations: "sell before"
and/or "purchase after" the disclosure of the unfavorable forecast.
Hence, using the two test periods, the follcwig operational hypotheses
are generated for the unfavoravle (U) forecast signal:
H_„: SCAR (S, lu) < for [-1/+6] (One signal only)
31 b'
SCAR (S, U) < for [-6/+1] (Two consistent signals)
b
K : SCAR (P JU) = for [-1/+6] (Two inconsistent signals)
3 2 a
SCAR (P |U) < for [-6/+1] (Cne Signal only)
H : SCAR (S |U) < for [-1/+6] (Two consistent signals)
41 cl
SCAR (S |U) < for [-6/+1] (One signal only)
H : SCAR (Pb |U) < for [-1/+6] (One signal only)
SCAR (?K j rJ) = for [-6/+1] (Two inconsistent signals)
Finally, note that the trade | forecast combinations in H , H , H
and H are strategies that would imply possible illegal trading by
corporate insiders, while the combinations in H , H ?n , H and H are
incompatible with such profit motives.
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RESULTS
A. Profitability of Insider Trading Strategies
The results pertaining to the trading combinations associated with
the favorable forecast signal are presented in Table 3 and those
pertaining to the unfavorable forecast signal are presented in Table 4.
Insert Tables 3 and 4 here
Results are also provided in each table for a sub-sample that is
labeled "intensive trading sample", which is restricted to the
firms/forecasts that were associated with insider trading of more than
5000 shares during the test period. This sub-sample consists of 79
firms and 112 forecasts, relative to the full sample of 101 firms and
134 forecasts.
For the favorable forecast signal (Table 3) , the only hypothesis
that was not confirmed was H for the period -1/+6. Even though this
period encompassed the effect of one signal only (the favorable
forecast) , the result suggests that favorable forecasts which follow a
period of selling by insiders appear to have their effect diluted and do
not lead to a positive market reaction. Note that although the precise
gain to specific insiders from their trading activities is not measured
here, it is clear from the results of H ' , for example, that
postponement of the sale until after the favorable forecast allows
23
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insiders to benefit from the positive forecast effect (see results for
period -6/+1) .
For the unfavorable forecast signal (Table 4) , the results indicate
that most (though not all) of the signs for SCAR are negative as
expected, but significance levels are not reached. In two cases, even
the signs are opposite to those expected. For the case of H (period
-6/+1) , the two consistent signals of insider sales and unfavorable
forecast should have led to a negative reaction, but the observed
returns are positive (though not significant) . This finding is
difficult to exclain. Also, for the case of H„_ (period -1/+6) , the
42
only signal contained in this period is the unfavorable forecast signal,
and hence the reaction should be negative. The observed positive result
seems to suggest that the market appears to discount the effect of
unfavorable forecasts which are preceeded by significant insider
purchasing activity. Note, however, that this finding is similar to the
apparent anomaly observed above in the case of H (period -1/+6)
.
Together, they seem to suggest that the market reaction to the forecast
(whether favorable or unfavorable) is substantially diluted if the
actual insider trading activity that preceeds the forecast is
"inconsistent" with the forecast signal.
The results also suggest a general, though weak, inference about
insider selling activities. The results for H (period -1/+6) , as well
as those in Table 3, appear to suggest that the market dees not view
selling activity as a signal that necessarily implies private
information use. The lack of a strong negative reaction to selling
activity perhaps indicates that the market views such activity as being
26
consistent with diverse motivations, not just those related to profit-
taking from discretionary disclosures.
To enable the reader to evaluate the economic significance (in
terns of the levels and the tine patterns) of the returns associated
with the different insider trading/management forecast combinations, the
unstandardized cumulative abnormal returns are depicted in Figure 1
(Panels A through D)
.
Insert Figure 1 here
B. Returns Associated With Knowledge of Management EPS Forecasts
As discussed earlier, the validity of the insider trading
strategies hinges on the assumption that insiders believe that a
favorable (unfavorable) EPS prediction will result in a positive
(negative) stock market reaction. Although results of prior research
studies (Patell, 1976; Jaggi, 1973; and Penman, 1980) have confirmed the
validity of such an assumption, it is important, in the interest of
internal validity, to establish that this relationship holds for the
particular sample used in this study.
To test the hypothesis that insiders ' EPS predictions are impounded
in security prices in a direction, consistent with the nature of the
signal conveyed, the following abnormal return metric is used:
5(F - U), = (SAIL JF - SAR, |u)
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Unstandardized Cu-mraulative Abnormal ?.eturns« (CAR )
for Insider Trading/Management Forecast Combinations
CAR
+1 Months
o.JO CAR
\s /u
a
FIGURE 1 (PANEL A)
? , S : Insiders' trades were primarily "purchase before" or "sale
after" the announcement of SPS forecast by management,
respectively.
F, j Management forecast of EPS was favorable or unfavorable
relative to just prior analyst's forecast, respectively.
Tine : Month "0" was the month in which management announced their
IPS forecast.
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Unstandardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns {CAS. )
for Insider Trading/ Management forecast Combinations
9.™ CAR
P
b
/F
VD
•I •> )
CAR
q
e.u
o.to
0.05
-...
-» *>
---~_* 1
-0.0J
"**•»
>v
-0.10
FIGURE 1 (PAKEL B)
Lecend:
P. , S :b a Insiders' trades were primarily "purchase before" or "sale
after" the announcement of EPS forecast by management,
respectively.
F, a : Management forecast of EPS was favorable or unfavorable
relative to just prior analyst's forecast, respectively.
Time Month "0" was the month in which management announced their
EPS forecast.
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Unstandardi=ed Cumulative Abnormal P.eturns (CAS )
for rnsider Trading/Management Forecast Combinations
CAR
o.so CAR
q
0.1S
9. IS
0.0S
^
-*
-0.01
-0.10
•1
- P /u
a
Lecer.d:
FIG'JRE 1 (PANEL C)
S. , P :b 4
I.-.^iders* trades were primarily "sale before" or "purchasa
after" the announcement of EPS forecast by management,
respectively.
F, U : Management forecast of EPS was favorable or unfavorable
relative to ;us: prior analyst's forecast, respectively.
?i--e : Month "0" was the month in which management announced their
E?S forecast.
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Unstar.dardized Cumulative Abnoraal Returns (CAR )
for Insider Trading/Mangeir.ent forecast Combinations
o--3 CAR
+6 S
b
/U
Months
CAR
P. /u
,• a
.
•i .j j •« /•«
V
Leaend:
FIGURE 1 (PANEL D)
SK' Pb a
Insiders' trades were primarily "sale before" or "purchase
after" the announcement of EPS forecast by management,
respectively.
?, U : Management forecast of EPI was favorable or unfavorable
relative to just prior analyst's forecast, respectively.
Ti=a Month "0" was the month in which management announced their
EPS forecast.
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Since prices are supposed tc decrease after the release of an
unfavorable forecast, the expectation for SAR | U is negative. Hence,
D(F - U) is the abnormal standardized returns associated with the
information content of the forecast signal (s). The related hypothesis
is:
H_: D(F-U) >
3
In order to restrict the testing of this hypothesis to effects of
management forecasts only (unrelated to effects of insider trading
activity per se)
,
particular combinations of pcrtfolios/time-periods
were examined. The results are deoicted in Table 5.
Insert Table 5 here
The test periods for portfolios 1 and 2 are chosen to limit the impact
to the forecast signal only. Note that the test period for portfolio 1
covers the forecast disclosure period and the period after the forecast,
while the dominant insider trading activity for these firms is confined
primarily to the period before the forecast. The reverse is true for
portfolio 2. The t-tests for these two portfolios are significant in
the correct direction and indicate that a trading strategy based on
private knowledge of forthcoming EPS predictions would generate
significant abnormal returns. Portfolios 3 and 4 are constructed so as
to neutralize the effect of related insider trading activity, thus
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capturing only the forecast effect. Here again the t-values are
significant, indicating that EPS forecasts by managers are potent
signals. These findings lend credence to the logic of the trading
strategies formulated earlier for testing the existence and extent of
illegal trading by insiders based on knowledge of forecast information.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Managers ' discretionary disclosures of accounting information are
an important part of the financial information used by securities
markets. Their motivation in making these disclosures has been the
subject of much recent interest (e.g.. Penman, 1982; Leftwich, Watts and
Zimmerman, 1982). This paper evaluates the hypothesis that managers
time their voluntary information disclosures in order to profit from
trading in the shares of their own firms. The voluntary dissemination
of annual earnings predictions by corporate officials was the particular
discretionary disclosure studied in this paper.
Comparing managers' predictions of EPS with prevailing market's
earnings expectations (as measured by analysts' forecasts) resulted in
partitioning the information content of forecasts into good news and bad
news. Several trading strategies of buying or selling (before or after
the disclosure of good or bad news) were formulated. These strategies
were labelled as those comprising consistent or inconsistent signals as
viewed by external market participants. Furthermore, each trading
combination was classified as either legal or (possibly) illegal
activity, depending en the likelihood that managers had exploited their
34
knowledge of the forecasts, or timed the release of such forecast
information so that it would render their trading more profitable.
Thus, while the study by Penman (1982) evaluated the impact of the
announcement of forecast disclosure by corporate managers on security
prices, this paper evaluated the profitability of various trading
strategies based en the specifi c information content (favorable _ or
unfavorable) of managers* predictions of earnings per share.
The results obtained in this study might be summarized as follows:
1. Trading strategies that are based on the information content
of the managers ' predictions of earnings dominate those that
are based on the signals provided by insiders' trading
activities.
2. Profitable trading strategies were consistently obtained by
following the joint signal of (a) favorable earnings forecasts
and (b) purchasing by insiders. That is, significant abnormal
returns were earned following either of the following two
strategies:
(i) buy and hold when a favorable forecast was preceded by
heavy buying by insiders; and
(ii) buy and hold when heavy buying by insiders was preceded
by a favorable forecast.
The two signals of favorable forecast and heavy purchasing
activity by insiders are viewed as mutually reinforcing
signals of managers' views about the prospects of the
companies. On the other hand, selling activity does not seem
to be looked upon as a significant signal.
3. The test results did not generate a consistent pattern for the
profitability of observed trading combinations that are likely
to be illegal — that is, timing the trade relative to the
disclosure of insider information so as to earn profits or
avoid the incurrence of a loss.
Although Penman (1982) did not use the explicit information content
of managers' earnings forecasts, he concluded. by suggesting that the
evidence supports the assumption that managers profitably exploit inside
information. However, closer inspection of Penman's analysis (rather
than his conclusion) may render his results consistent with the details
of the results reported in this paper. In particular, Penman evaluated
35
the association between an index of insider trading (called T) and
abnormal returns around the date of managers' earnings forecast
announcements. The index T consisted cf a comparison between the sum of
(a) net purchases by insiders before the disclosure cf earnings
forecasts, and (b) net purchases by insiders after the disclosure.
Hence, if purchasing activity is the dominant signal, then obtaining a
positive and significant coefficient for the explanatory variable T is
compatible with the one-sided scenario of a significant association
between the purchasing (but not necessarily selling) activities of
insiders and abnormal returns. But, like Allen's study, Penman did not
evaluate the explicit information content for managers' forecasts, and
the details of abnormal returns associated with only selling activities
are not available. In summary, the analysis conducted in this study
uses an explicit measure of the information content of managers'
forecasts (relative to analysts' forecasts) and provides a detailed test
of several possible combinations of the two signals of interest (the
fcrecast and the insider trading).
As with most studies dealing with insider trading, this paper
relied on the SEC's Official Summary to obtain information on insider
trading. However, the Official Summary is conceptually incomplete in
that, trading by those who might have access to inside information but
are net corporate officials (or otherwise covered by the SEC's "insider"
definition) are not included in the summary. Furthermore, insider
trading on options might be more profitable than insider trading on
stocks because of the low transaction ccsts (and margin requirements)
associated with trading on options. The Official Summary does not
include insider trading en options other than that directly related to
36
the exercise of options. Finally, disclosure of earnings forecasts by
corporate officials might no be rnade directly (since strong evidence is
available about the significant level of indirect releases of forecasts
through analysts) . These observations tend to iirtit the
ceneralizabilitv of the obtained results.
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Footnotes
1. Work en this project started in 1980. Not placing much
confidence in the results of a smaller sample led us to collect
more data and tighten the research design. The results are
unaltered, however.
2. Fearing an increase in insider trading violations despite its
vigorous enforcement efforts in recent years, the SEC submitted
a new bill to Congress in late 1982 that would toughen the
sanctions for violations (see SEC Release "Insider Trading
Sanctions Act," 1982). A recent case reported in the Wall
Street Journal (September 27, 1983) relates to the topic of
this paper. The SEC charged two officials of Warner
Communications Inc.'s Atari subsidiary with illegally selling
Warner securities shortly before Warner announced that its
earnings for 1982 would be below analysts' expectations (and
its stock plummeted) . Note also that the implied measure of
market expectations used is analysts' forecasts (as used in
this study)
.
3. Section 32 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (as amended)
provides penalties up to $10,000 or not more than five years
imprisonment: for violation of any provision of the Securities
Act. Furthermore, short selling by insiders is unlawful.
4. In the Fama sense of market efficiency, the securities market
is considered semi-strong form efficient if it processes all
publicly available information quickly and in an unbiased
manner. Much of the empirical evidence to date supports the
semi-strong form of market efficiency. Since the results
reported by Finnerty (1976) and Jaffe (1974) indicate that the
use of insider trading to formulate trading strategies could
yield significant abnormal profits for a period of up to 11
months after the trade, it is implied that the market had not
processed the signals of insider trading for that long a
period. Such an implication is inconsistent with ail the
empirical evidence that supports semi-strong form efficiency.
5. Cur data on management forecasts is part of a data base
compiled by two different Ph.D. candidates for their own
dissertation related work. All other data was collected
explicitly for this study.
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